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Investment director turnover
and the impact on
performance
If investment directors are talented you try to keep them. If they
are not performing, they are asked to leave. But what is the effect
of this on fund performance? DAVID GALLAGHER and
PRASHANTHI NADARAJAH provide some recent research.
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nvestment director turnover is
closely scrutinised by almost all
market participants—including
investment consultants, ratings
agencies, superannuation trustees, retail
investors, analysts, as well as the
financial press.  
Senior staff departures from
investment management institutions
almost always receive coverage in
financial newspapers. In addition,
investment director departures often
lead to an analysis of the implications
for the investment firm, as well as
speculation as to true reasons behind
the resignation (or termination).  




opportunities to participate in new
boutique fund start-ups, poaching by 
a rival entity, and through mergers or
takeovers by competitors.  
We cannot discount the possibility 
that any number of these factors are
interrelated. However, the most likely
and significant explanation of
investment director turnover is
expected to be performance.   
So why are investment director changes
of importance? This can be answered
from a number of perspectives—the
manufacturer’s perspective (i.e. fund
manager), the consumer’s perspective
(i.e. investor), and the analyst’s perspective
(i.e. asset consultants and ratings agencies). 
Performance is a key driver
First, given that fund performance is a
key revenue driver for the firm’s fund
managers, then good past performance
should translate into positive fund
inflows, which in turn impact
profitability (given that earnings are
determined as a percentage of assets
under management). The converse is
also the case for poor performers.  
Investment firms should therefore be
concerned about retaining their ‘stars’
and encouraging underperformers to
consider other endeavours. Investors
are also concerned with the
implications for investment returns
surrounding the departure of a key staff
member, particularly on how the
change might impact on the
achievement of investment objectives.  
Asset consultants and ratings agencies
devote significant research resources to
assisting their clients in making
optimal investment decisions,
including fund selection. Investment
director replacement requires
professional advisers to be forward-
looking and form a view about the
future prospects of incumbent
investment management institutions.  
Investment director expectations
While fund performance is a significant
determinant of investment director
changes, an equally important question
remains—what performance impact is
expected from an incoming investment










director? All three market participants
(identified above) will be concerned
about the future performance
implications for those institutions
experiencing investment director
replacement. Managers will either seek
to elevate an internal member of the
investment team to replace the
departing sector head, or to identify a
talented individual from a competitor
firm and encourage them to defect.
The replacement decision is critically
important for both outperforming and
underperforming institutions.
This research examines the
relationship between investment
performance and investment director
turnover experienced by Australian
investment institutions. An empirical
analysis is warranted, given the limited
evidence concerning the performance
impact surrounding the replacement of
an investment director. Specifically, we
investigate the extent to which
investment director turnover is related
to a fund’s (1) relative performance in
the market, (2) portfolio risk, and (3)
net fund flow activity.  
Prior research
Khorana published two US studies
examining top management turnover
of mutual fund managers in 1996 and
2001. Partitioning the sample into
underperformers (negative excess
returns to the benchmark) versus
outperformers (positive excess returns
to the benchmark), Khorana found:
• Underperformance in funds in the
two years prior to replacement is a
significant predictor of investment
director turnover. Post-replacement,
underperforming funds significantly
improve their performance.  
• Outperforming funds in the period
prior to replacement experience a
significant deterioration in
performance after the departure.  
• A significant difference existed in fund
growth rates in the year prior to
managerial turnover between those
experiencing and not experiencing
replacement. Underperforming funds
experienced substantial decreases in net
asset flows in the pre-replacement period.
An analysis of the Australian
evidence has previously been examined
twice—first by the Frank Russell Company,
and second by Gallagher (2001). Scott
Donald from Frank Russell analysed the
performance of Australian equity and
fixed-interest portfolios both before and
after the departure of the head of the
portfolio management team. The study
included 66 departures (43 in equities
and 23 in fixed interest) between
January 1994 and December 1999. 
The main findings of the study were
that on average, fixed interest
performance increases after the
departure, whereas for equity accounts,
performance improved in more than
half of the observed turnover events.
Gallagher (2001) also briefly examined
the performance–turnover relationship
in Australian equities, finding that
while performance decreased in the 
six-month post-replacement period,
performance actually increased after 
a 12-month post-replacement period.  
Data and research approach
Investment director changes are
examined in the period January 1991 
to April 2001. We define investment
director changes as personnel changes
in the roles of Head of Australian
Equities (AEQ), Head of Australian
Fixed Interest (AFI) and Chief
Investment Officer (CIO).  
This data was compiled using
information contained in historical
IFSA Investment Manager
Questionnaires and data from Mercer
Investment Consulting. To be included
in the sample, the study requires
investment managers to be employed
in their role for a period of at least 
12 months prior to the turnover
month. Accordingly, the sample
contains a total of 90 investment
director changes (41—Head of AEQ, 
16—Head of AFI and 33—CIO.)
In terms of performance data we
identify wholesale funds of the
investment managers in the
appropriate asset classes. The balanced
fund data is used to examine changes
surrounding CIO replacement. For
wholesale equities and bonds, the study
identifies all funds offered by the
investment management firm.  
In aggregate, the study includes 136
funds. The monthly fund performance
and size data is obtained from
Morningstar for actively managed
Australian equities and Australian fixed
interest funds. Only those active funds
whose investment objectives were to
outperform either the S&P/ASX 200 or
the S&P/ASX 300 Accumulation Index
(Australian equities) or the UBS
Warburg Composite Bond Index (all
maturities and Australian bonds) are
included. Balanced fund returns from
Mercer Investment Consulting are
employed, including benchmark asset
allocations and fund size data.  
When investment manager changes
arise, the reasons for the departure
cannot be explicitly identified.
Accordingly, the study follows
Khorana’s (2001) technique as a means
of assigning the possible reasons
behind director replacement. This is
achieved by partitioning all turnover
events into two sub-samples—a
negative performance sample (NP) and
a positive performance sample (PP).
Those investment director replacements
whose returns in the period are above
(i.e. PP) or below (i.e. NP) benchmark
(for the relevant sectors) represent
proxies for the potential reason behind
replacement.  
Performance measurement
Investment performance is measured
using three approaches—the one and
four-factor alphas (i.e. risk-adjusted
excess returns), and the excess return to
benchmark (not adjusted for risk).
Risk-adjusted performance is estimated
using the ordinary least squares method
(OLS), and controls for the market
factor only in the single index model.
The four-index model adjusts for risk
in equity fund performance by
accounting for additional risk factors
explaining equity returns—namely the
market index, investment style factors
Investors are also concerned with the implications for investment returns
surrounding the departure of a key staff member, particularly on how the
change might impact on the achievement of investment objectives.  


















capitalisation of stocks) and past price
momentum. The four-factor alpha is
essentially a risk-adjusted, style-
controlled performance measure.
Further details concerning these models
can be found in Gallagher and
Nadarajah (2003).  
Risk
The study considers three measures of
portfolio risk: systematic (non-
diversifiable) risk (i.e. beta risk),
idiosyncratic or residual risk (i.e.
diversifiable risk) and tracking error.
The systematic risk is defined as the
portfolio’s beta.  
Residual risk is calculated as the
standard deviation of residuals (or error
term) from a one-factor model.  The
tracking error of a portfolio is defined
as the standard deviation of monthly
portfolio excess returns to the
portfolio’s benchmark index. The
tracking error measure is of particular
interest, given that the IFSA survey of
manager responses tends to indicate
that managers identify this measure as
an important component of their risk
control. The systematic and residual
risk measures are also considered, given
their importance in finance as measures
of non-diversifiable and diversifiable
risk components, respectively.  
For the purposes of this study, we
have defined Year 0 to represent the 
12 months prior to the investment
director replacement month. Likewise,
Year –1 is the 12-month period prior 
to Year 0, Year 1 is the 12-month period
after the managerial replacement month
and Year 2 is the 12-month period after
Year 1. Taken together, Year –1 and Year
0 is defined as the pre-replacement
period, and Year 1 and Year 2 is defined
as the post-replacement period.
Findings
Performance is measured using the
excess return to the benchmark, 
one-factor alpha and the four-factor
alpha (Australian equity funds only).
As expected, in the pre-replacement
period, average levels of performance
(for all measures) are negative (positive)
for the NP (PP) sub-sample.  
Determining the impact on performance
post-replacement represents one of the
NP PP































Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2
FIGURE 1 AVERAGE PERFORMANCE (EXCESS RETURN TO THE BENCHMARK) 
IN ALL FUNDS IN THE PRE– AND POST–REPLACEMENT PERIODS
FIGURE 2 AVERAGE PERFORMANCE (ONE-FACTOR ALPHA) IN ALL FUNDS 
IN THE PRE– AND POST–REPLACEMENT PERIODS
FIGURE 3 AVERAGE PERFORMANCE (FOUR-FACTOR ALPHA) IN EQUITY FUNDS 
IN THE PRE– AND POST–REPLACEMENT PERIODS
most important contributions of this
study. For the NP sample, both the 
one-factor alpha and the excess returns
to the benchmark exhibit statistically
significant increases in both the mean
and median levels of performance in
the post-replacement years.  
These results emphasise that
institutions discipline poor performers
by terminating employment, and when
termination arises, the post-
replacement appointment delivers NP
funds with a significant performance
improvement. This confirms the
activation of healthy internal corporate
control mechanisms. The four-factor
alphas provide a more rigorous
examination of performance for active
equity funds, given that the alphas
control for investment style biases
inherent in the portfolios. The results
for four-factor alphas are also generally
consistent with the overall findings.  
Turnover of outperforming managers
translates into significantly lower
returns post-replacement. This indicates
that superior performing managers
departed organisations either on the
basis of inadequate remuneration
levels, being poached by a competitor,
or retirement from the industry. 
We also report that for Australian
equities measured using the four-factor
model, performance two years post-
replacement for NP funds is higher
than that of PP funds. However, this is
not to say that NP funds become
outperformers in the overall market.

















FIGURE 5 AVERAGE TRACKING ERROR AND RESIDUAL RISK FOR ALL FUNDS IN 
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concerned with performance evaluation
for managers experiencing replacement,
rather than including all funds
operating in the market and included
in performance surveys. In addition,
the turnover events occur at different
points over the business cycle.
In terms of portfolio risk, the study
finds that both the NP and PP samples
decrease beta (i.e. systematic risk) as
replacement approaches. However, in
the post-replacement period, beta again
increases towards unity—which is in
line with the market index.  
We also examine risk according to
tracking error and idiosyncratic risk 
(or residual risk) measures. For
background, if beta accounts for 
non-diversifiable market risk, then 
the residual risk component reflects the
degree of risk that is otherwise diversifiable
by holding a larger number of securities. 
We also understand that beta and
residual risk will be interactive, in the
sense that increasing the number of
stocks in the portfolio will bring the
fund into closer alignment with the
market, and therefore reduce residual
portfolio risk. We also know that the
CAPM only prices non-diversifiable
systematic risk, such that returns are
dependent on general market risk
exposures.  
Our study finds that underperforming
managers increase both their fund’s
idiosyncratic (residual) risk and tracking
error in the pre-replacement period.
We might expect this to be the case if
managers become concerned about
rectifying their poor performance
history. Our results further indicate that
underperforming managers actively
increase the portfolio composition
away from benchmark weights in an
attempt to reverse underperformance.
This is in contrast to new hires (joining
previously underperforming
institutions) who subsequently reduce
residual risk and tracking error in the
post-replacement period (however,
from a statistical perspective, we do not
find that this risk reduction is
statistically significant).  
Our third and final evaluation of the
turnover of investment directors
considers the investor’s response to
fund performance, given the assets
entering and leaving the fund. In
results not directly reported, we did
consider a multivariate regression
model that was used to determine the
impact of underperformance vs.
outperformance on net fund flows—
contingent on investment manager
turnover. We find that underperforming
investment managers experience
significantly lower net fund flows prior
to replacement, indicating the existence
of a well functioning external corporate
control mechanism—investors indeed
discipline poor performance. These
results are not surprising, particularly
given that the source of revenue for
investment management firms is
determined as some percentage of total
assets under management.
Summary
This study provides a comprehensive
analysis of the performance, risk and
fund flow characteristics associated
with the replacement of Australian
investment directors. In particular we
find that:
• Turnover for underperforming
investment directors results in
significantly higher performance in
the post-replacement period (where
the term ‘significant’ is used to
indicate statistical significance);  
• Departures for outperforming
managers translate into significantly
lower returns post-replacement;  
• Underperforming investment
managers significantly increase their
fund’s idiosyncratic (residual) risk and
tracking error in the pre-replacement
period. While newly appointed
investment directors reduce the
portfolio’s residual risk and tracking
error post-replacement, we find that
this risk reduction is not statistically
significant. 
• Investors allocate significantly lower
fund flows to underperforming
investment managers prior to
replacement, which is a contributor
to executive termination. 
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